Springville Banking Co. v. C. Taylor Burton et al : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
Springville Banking Co. v. C. Taylor Burton et al :
Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Franklyn B. Matheson; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, No. 9066 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3368
Ci.-t J ·95 
-.t. l: 1 9 
:e .. = Fit: ED 
SE? 1 4 1959 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
SPRING\TILLE BANKING COM-
pANY, a c.orporation, 
Plamt.vft and Appellant, 
-vs.-
C. T.A. \~rJOR BUR.TOX, ERNEST H. 
BALCI·l~ \V~:JSTON E. HAMILTON, 
FRAXCIS F~J./PCH and ,V. J. 
S ~\111 t r J~ individually and as members 
of the lJ~rAH STATI~~ ROAD COM-
MISSION? 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
9066 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Responde-nts 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Ptlge 
STATEMENT 0 F FACTS r •• r •••••••• r ••• r-~ ---~-- r •• r ••• r• r-~ ~-- --&~-- --~. ~~. ~~ ~~- -~ 1 
STA 'TE ME NT 0 F PO INTS~rr. ••• ••• ••~ • r. •••~ •• • r .. ••• • • • • •• ~-- ~u• u&o u~. ~- ~--. ---- 4 
ARGUMENT -- --~ • ~~ ---• -T ------------ • -~- rr~ -- • rr~ •-r rrT • r~ rr• • •~ • ~ • • r • ~~~ • ~~ • ~~ • ---, -T, TT~r• rr 4 
POINT I. UNDER THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN 
PLAINTIFFJS ~COMPLAINT THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS NO 
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS 
INDIVIDUALLY OR AS MEMBERS OF THE 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION.~~~·------------ 4 
POINT II. THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO STATE 
A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED, ___ T~OTT .. - .. r 18 
CON CL Us I 0 N T ~- • • ~ • • •~ • •- • ~T • •~ • rr • r~ • ~~ • r• • •• • •~- ~- • -~- --- -~- ~-~- ------------------- T• 0 0 0 -~ •• 82 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
24 Am. J ur~~ Public Highways ..... ~--~~·~--~~-~~-~~-·~-·-~·~···---------------------- 18 
25 Am. Jur~, Highways~ Sec~ 15'4---------·~T-------r-·------··~·····u•u----------- 17 
34 Am. J ur ~:II Mandamus, Sec. 4. ~~. ~~ ~~~. -~ _ ---~~~ ~-- --~ ___________________ T •• T _ ••••• T. 29 
34 Am. J ut.t Mandamus~ See. 7 -T~rT····r~·~T·T-·r·T·····~·-~--·. ·~·---·-------- _____ 30 
84 Am. J ur.' Mandamus' Sec~ 123_----------------------------.---- -T- -- •• n.-- .. -- 30 
43 ALR 2d 1072 ~~ ·~-· ·~- ---~~~~- ___ ·~·· -·---·~~·· --·~ ··~- --~· ~~· ~--- _____________________ 17, 18 
9{JI ALR 1482 T"- ""TO •-- --•• ~~• r ••- --•- ---T •-~ ---- ••• •--- ------- --•-T•----T ••r- --- ---• or~ -•-- ------. 21 
97 ALR 192 ---------------------------------------------------- • -- ~--- -------------------• r--, T, • •, 21 
100 ALR 491 ~ • ~ • • •• • • • •• • ~~ • ~- • ~-~ • • • -~ • •• • ~-• • • • • •• • ~~ • • • • • •- ~-T • rr •- ~ • ~-- -•~ • • ~- -- •- -~- --------- 21 
118 A LR 921 r • r~- ~-- r• • •-- -- • r• • rT~ r• • r•~ • •~ ---- r~ • • -T -~ • • r• •--- ~- • r~T -- • -r •- -- • •--- •- • ~ • • •- • -~- • • 21 
55 C.J. S.l" Mandamust Sec. 51 ------------·---------------·------------------------·---- 29 
2 Moores Fed. PracT~ 2nd Ed. 2244.LO·--·~·····-------~·····-"···---------------- 14 
CASES CITED 
BJackham v~ Snelgrov~ 1955t 3 U. 2d 157,~ 280 P~ 2d 453 ________ 14 
Board of Education of 0 gden v. Anderson~ 93 Utah 522, 
7 4 P r 2d 681' 193 7 ------------------------ T"O •-•r•~~~ -•~~ •~- -~-- ---------------------- 29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENT~(.Continned) 
Page 
Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Commission, 1937, 95 
Utah 242, 70 P. 2d 857 ------,--------·-------·---------------------------·----·-·· 5 
Cara~ena v. State, 2 69 W i.sc. 608a~ 71 N .. W L 2d 27 6 ___________________ . 22 
City Service Oil Co. v. City of New York, 195St N.Y .. , 15! 
N .E 0 2d 814 ----------- ------- ~r-- ~~~ • • r-~- ~• • • -~~ • ~••• • r~ • • •• •~ r•~ • L••• • •• • ~- --• • ~-•~ • •. --- 25 
Dooly Block, et al. v .. Salt Lake Rapid Tranejt ·Co., 33 P .. 229 ... L 25 
Hjorth, et aL v. Whittenburg~ et al., 1952, 241 P. 2d 907:-
121 Utah 324 ~-~-~ .. ·~·r·~·--~ .. ·--~~~ .......... -~-5, 61' 7t 9t lOt 12, 18, 33, 34 
Hoffman v. Lewis, Judge, 31 Utah 179, 87 P. 167, 170~ 1906 .... 29 
Lang]ey Shopping Center v. State Roods Commission, 1957, . 
Md., i31 A. 2d 690 •~~~•r••••~••r~••••••~••••~•••••~•r~•••••••••~-~•••••-~-~---•----- 23 
Miles v. Arms troilg, C.A. 7tbt 1953) 207 F L 2d 284, as a b-
~Stracted at 2 1\:Ioores Fed~ Prac., 2nd Ed. J 19 58 Sup,p., 
p. 2 00 -------------- ~-- ---- __ ,- --------, ~~-- __ ,- ~--------,--- -------- -~-- ----- --·-.- ----- -~- .. -- 15 
Muse v. !\lis sissi ppi St.a te Highway Commission. 103 S. 2d 
852 ---- ~~- ..... ------------. ~-.- ---- -~- --~-- -~-- --~- ---- ---~----- ---- --·- ------------------------ 21 
Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandlert 1957 Okla., 316 
P • 2d 828 '-"•••••~,,r••"~''" .,,~,---------•- .. ---- .. ~·----••~~------------~•.,------~·-- • • 24 
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U~S. l:o 11 S. Ct. -6991' 35 L. 
Ed. 36 3 ------------------------.--------- -~-. ~-.- ~-.- -- .. -~----:-- -~ ...... L~--- •••• ---------- 30 
RameJli v. City of New OrleansJ 1957 La. I' 96 S. 2d 672 ____________ 23 
Reardon v. Daly City!' 1945 Cal.) 163 P .. 2d 462-----------------------·---- 29 
Robinett v. Price (1929), 74 Utah 512, 280 Pac. 736~---~-------19, 20 
Sm1ick v. CommonweaJth, 1954 Ky.~ 268 S.W. 2d 424 ____________________ 22 
State v. District Court, Fourth Judicia] Districtt 1937~ 94 
Utah 384~ 78 PL 2d 502 ___ ·----~-------------------·-------------------5, 6, ·7, 8, 9 
State of Utah v. Fred Tedesco~ et a1.~ 1955, 286 P. 2d 785, 
4 U ~ 2d ~)1 --- --- -r- ----------, "nn, •----• no-, "L •-- ---- ~-- ~--- ------- -u--- ---- ______ 12t 13 
State High way Department v. S tri ckJ.andf 19 58 Ga.~ 102 S.E. 
2d 3 • • -- • • -- • • •. • •- • • -- • • -- • LL~ 0 • -- • •- •. --- • -- • --- • --- • -- • • -- • • -- • • -- • ---- • --' '~- • • -- '• ~-"" ---. --- 24 
Thomas and Warner t Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 1956 La,, 
89 s 0 2d 885 ·-- ••-- ••--•• -----·· _,,L--•" ,,, ~~-- -~· L ••• --· ---· --- ---· ----•• -,----· .,,, •n 22 
Zions Radlroad and Light Corporation v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 
544, 231 N .W. 461 ~--------------------------,--,-~,. .. , .. L----~------------.-- ... ___ 17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
STATUTES ICITED Page 
Sec. 27-2-1, U. C .A. 1953~ as amended_------------------------------------------- 4 
Sec. 27-2-13, U .C.A. 1958 ------•r-------.~---------------------------·~--r~~~-~-~-r------ 2 
Sec~ 27-2-7 ~ U ~ C .A. 1953 ______ --~ -~ ________________ -~~ -~- ___ . ________________________ . ___ _ 15 
Sec. 2 7 -9-3! U. C~A. 1953 __________ . ___ -~. ~~. __ . ~-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ __ _ ___ ___ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ 16 
Sec. 63-6-17, U.C.A. 1953 ·~~·~~·-~·~~·-~········~·---·--·-------------------------------- 11 
Title 78~ Ch. 83~ U.C.A. 1953.r··-~·-··~~·· ··~-·-~·r···--·· ··~··---~-·~--------------2, 31 
Title 7St Chr 34~ U .. ·C.A. 1953-~----~~--~·--·~~·r···-·---·~ .. ···- ·-- ... ---~---~-- _. ___ 2" 30 
Art. J,. Sec. 22~ Utah Const.-----------------------~---·----r•rr-•-~•r~•- ----··· ·-·~••r•••2, 8 
Art. VIIt Sec .. 13, Utah Const.u··---------------------------------------------------- 9 
Rule 65(b) ( 3) t Utah Rules of ·Civil Procedure---~---------------------- 2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
SPRINGVlljlJE BANKING ·CO:M~ 
PANY, a corporation1 
Plaint~ff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
C. TAYLOR B1JRTON, ERNEST H. 
BALCif, 'VESTON .l~~. HAlfiLTON, 
FRANCIS FELTCH and W. J. 
S~IIRL~ individually and as members 
of the UTAH STATE ROAD COM-
MISSION, 
Defendants and Respo-ndents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9066 
On or about February 4, 1959, complaint in the above 
entitled matter 'vas filed and personal service made the 
following day upon t\\•o of the defendants, C. Taylor 
Burton and ll'l e~ton E. HaJniJton~ In said complaint 
plaintiff alleges ownershjp and possession of a lot and 
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building located on the northeast corner of 7th South 
and h:lain Streets in Springville, ·utah County, lT tah, and 
that in about April and May, 1958, defendants con-
structed con ere te strips or it5lands within the boundaries 
of Main Street in ~uch a n1anner as to jmperle ingress 
and egress to and from plaintiff's property, and that 
planitiff's property has been greatly depreciated thereby~ 
Plaintiff adnrit~ that said strips or islands were oon-
struct.~d for t.bc use of the publie in a skillful and proper 
manner, hut further alleges that by such construction 
the defendants have damaged plaintiff's property "rithln 
the meaning of Article I, Section 22 J 1~ tab (;onstitution. 
Plaintiff therefore ask~ the ·Court for a declaration 
pursua11t to Title 78, Chapter 33, L".C.A. 1953, that for 
su~ll damages t.hP- plaintiff iR entitled to eompensation 
and further, for an order purHua.nt to Rule 65 (b) (3), of 
tlte 1Jtah R-ule~ of Civil Procedure, eornpelling the de-
fendant6 to in it.lat.e an action against the plaintiff in 
areordance \vith the provisions of Title 78~ Chapter 34~ 
l,..~C ..... :\.. 1953, for the purp-ose of ascertaining and a~~ess-
ing the mnount. of datnagcH~ {See Coln}llaint, R. 1) L 
The defendants, hy and through the _A ttorrlf!.Y (}en-
·eral or the State of Utah, aR provided in Sert.ion ~7 -2-1:~, 
U.C . .t\_. 1953, moved to dismiss the complaint as follo'v~: 
(R. 4). 
''(~ome no\v the defendants b:v and thruugh 
t.h~ Attorney General of the State of lTtah, as 
provided in Section 27-2-13, 1Jtah Code Annotated 
1953, and move the court aR follov,~s : 
1. To dismiss the action or. in lieu thereof, 
to quash the returns of service of summons on 
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the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject ntatt.e r·, or if the court finds it does have 
jurisdir.tjon over the subject matter, 
24 To dismiss the action for: 
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the per son R 
of defendants, and 
(b) failure to state a claim against de-
fendants upon 'vhich relief can be granted." 
On April2-2,. 1959, thP. IIonorable Ste,vart M. Hanson, 
Judge, District Court. of Salt Lake County, after oral 
argument and the presentat.ion of briefs hy the respective 
partie~, disn1issed plaintiff'f.; action. Plaintiff no-\v ap-
peals from said dismissaL 
For the purpose of cJarifiration and to assist the 
Court in visuaJiz·ing U1e situation involved, "\Ve enclose 
and attach hereto as itppenrllx A a schematie dra~ring., 
prepared hy the Utah Itoarl Commi~sion, of the area 
involved in plain tiff's con1plaint. For purpose of identi-
fication the area f.;hn\vn in yello\v is 7th South Street; the 
area sh ov.'ll in bro'vn rna r ked ''L '' line is Main Street ; 
the area sl10Vt11 in brovm marked ''F~' line is the north 
bound lanes of l'". SL High\va~l 89-91; the area sho\vn in 
red is the frame store allegedly belonging to the plaintiff; 
the areaf.; sho,vn in green are the median strips, or as 
designated in the complaint, conerete islands, claimed to 
inter£ ere 1vi th ingress and egress to plaintiff's frame 
~tore. Y 011 'vill note that l\fain Street is no'v de signa ted 
as a one-v,cay street Vt'ith traffic flo,ving north1vard. 7th 
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South remains a two-way street~ U. S. Ilighway 89-91 
is divided as to south-bound and north-bound traffic 
by the median strips shown~ 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT L 
UNDER THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFJS 
COMPLAINT THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFEND-
ANTS INDIVIDUALLY OR AS ME?vlBERS OF THE UTAH 
STATE ROAD COMMISSION. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM 




UNDER THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFtS 
C011PLAINT THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFEND-
ANTS INDIVIDUALLY OR AS MEJ\'IBERS OF THE UTAH 
STATE ROAD COMMISSION~ 
S eeti on 27 -2-1~ {T .. C~A- 1953, as arnended, reads in 
part as follows: 
''* * • By its name the commission tnay sue, 
and it may be sued only on 'Nl"itten contracts made 
by it or under its authority. • * •" 
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In the case of Campbell Building Company v. State 
Road Commission, 1937, 95 Utah 242~ 70 P.2d 857, tlris 
Court held that tlte State Road Con1mission is an arm 
or agency of the state and that~ therefore, the State 
Road ·Commission cannot be sued by nature of sovereign 
irnmunity unless the state, through legislative or consti-
tutional action 7 has given its consent. This Court then 
~tat.es that the consent by the state to be ~ued on certain 
contracts of the Road Commission does not open the 
door to liability on -acconn t of the negligence or nliscon-
duct or wilful conduct or unauthorized acts of officers 
or agents of the state. 
In the case of Stale v. JJistrict Cou-rt, l!'ou.·rth Judicial 
IJ.istrict, 1937 ~ 94 lJtah 384, 78 P.2d 849, th.is Court held 
that an injunction suit to rrestrain the St.ate Iioad Com-
mission fron1 constructing a viaduct along a portion of a 
street could not be nlaintaincd since such suit "\Va~ one 
against the state and there was no consent to be sued or 
waiver of state's irnmunity fro1n suit. 
We submit, therefore, that the Di.stnct Court of 
Salt Lake County has no jurisdiction over the defendants 
af.; mernbers of the State lloarl Commi~sion nnder the 
faets aUeged in plaintiff's complaint. From page 25 of 
the brief of appellant in tl1 is appeal, we asr.;ume there 
is no argument on this point .. 
As to the jurisdiction of the District Court over the 
individual members of the State Road Commir.;sion~ we 
cite the case of R jortlt, et al. 11. Wki"ttenhurg ~ et al., 1952, 
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241 P. 2d 907, 121 {i tah 324, ¥lhe rein this Court stated 
that: 
'• \Ve hold that where consequential injury to 
property arise8 out of the faithful and honest 
perforrnance of duties imposed hy laVJt· upon menl-
bers o.f the l~oad Cormnis sion, such officialR are 
not required to respond personally~'' (241 P.2d~ 
p~ 909) 
I~,aced ""~it.h the decision of "\vhat \Ve shall hereafter 
refer to as the Fourth District case (Atate v. District 
Court, Fourth J11djcial District, supra), i.e~~ that the 
Road Commission ca.n not be enjoined ["rorn eonsc-
~ { u enti.al damage~ and the decision of the llj orth case 
( Hjorth, et at V~ VThittenburg, supra), i~e~, that the 
individual members of the ·Road Cornrni.H~ion Inay not 
be sued for consequential damages, the plaintiff now 
attempts to accon1plish the end denied in both the Fourth 
District r..ase an rl the Hj o rtl1 case by t} ~e skillful use of 
the procedural device of n1andamus. 
Tn our opinion the proper conclusion in this matter 
is predic.ated u·pon a c.orrect undert5tancling and recon-
ciliation of the 14, ourth District and Hj o rth ca 8es~ In the 
Fourth District case, the action v~ras fjled to enjoin the 
State Road Connnission from proceeding 'v ith c.c rtai n 
street improv·e-rncnts 'vhicl1 "'ould result in consequential 
damage to the plaintiff~ As in the instant matter~ there 
was no allegation of a taking, only that of a prospective 
darnage. ~rhe plaintiff in the Fourth D·istrict case argued 
that an injunction suit aginst the State Road Conunission 
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.. 
was not a suit against the State of l!talL The Court 
replied. 
~ ~"\\i e CBJlnot agree 'vith this argrnn en t. insofar 
as the Road Commission as such is concerned4 
It is an agency of the state and a suit against 
it is a suit against the state." (78 P.2d~ p. 504)4 
Then by "ray of dicta, the Court volunteered that '~. r • if 
the inilividual members of the R-oad Corruni.ssion are per-
sonally made parties defendant in the injunction suit~ the 
case ,vj}l be different than if prosecuted against the Road 
Comnrission R8 a body.~' (78 P.2d pg. 505). rrh1s dicta 
to the effect that the individual members of the ltoad 
Cotnnrission could be enjoined from a consequential 
damage ~ias argued by the plaintiff in the Hjorth ease 
as anU1ority for the proposition that the individual 
me1nbers of the Road ·Commission could be sued for 
consequential dan1ages. In revie,ving tlte finding8 of the 
trial court, this Court stated in the Hjorth eaHe as 
follows~ 
''The trial court relied to a -considerable 
extent upon the case State by State Road Com-
mission v. Distriet Court, Fourth i>Judirial Dis-
trict ~ ~ -a; which ·Involved an injunction against 
individual Incn1bers of the R-oad Conlillission and 
sOine of the language therein which seen1s to indi~ 
eate that the commissioners rnay be sued inruvidu~ 
ally for damages. We think~ however, that this 
dicta is not the true rule for reasonR which will 
hereinafter appearL In. fact, the dis~enting opinion 
of :Mr4 Chief ~Justice Wolfe foreshadows and 
suggests the holding in thi~ ease.'' (241 P .. 2d 908). 
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We could do nothing better in u:rging our position 
in the present matter than to quote verbatim the dissen~ 
ing argument of tlustice \Volfe in the Fourth District 
case. For brevity, however:t we refer only to the following 
points argued by Chief Justice 'lfolfe and refer the 
Court to the authorities eited by him. 
(1) There is a fundamental difference in the ''tak-
ing'' by a state agency and a damage consequent on the 
perfDrmance of the duty which does not involve a taking. 
(78 P.2d, p. 512). 
(2) If the Road Commissioners are acting within 
their authority, then even a suit against them individually 
as defendant~ is a sujt against the 8tate. (78 P.2d, p. 
512). It is fundamental that 1vhere those in charge of 
an agency representing the s·tate are sued in their indi-
vidual capacities, it is in effect a suit against the state 
if the act or aut1lority under which the)~ act is consti-
tutional, and they are acting withln that authority. The 
members of the State Road Commission, when acting 
witllln their authority in making changes in the high\vay 
for the saf et. y of the publj c, cannot be coerced or delayed 
by injunction into bringing a condemnation snit to have 
such damages appraised. (78 P .. 2d, p. 517 and 519)., 
( 3) The in elusion of the word '' dama.ged '' in Section 
22, Article I, T~tah Constitution, \vas intended to give a 
substantive right not theretofore enjoyed and did n.ot 
contemplate the matter of remedy.. ~rhat although the 
remedy to prevent a taking would bP. by injunction~ the 
remedy for damages \vould be enforced as it is enforrbi 
)n all other ra.ses against the state \vhere remedy is not 
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spooifieally given by statute, to-wit, by resort to the 
Board of Examiners. (78 P.2d, p. 513). 
(4) Even though the Road Commission, or the Road 
Comrnissioners individually, if acting within their au-
thority are immune from suit, the Board of Examiners 
is adequate remedy for a claim of consequential damages 
and rneets the test of due process of law .. The claim of 
consequential damages is in the same class with all other 
claims against the state and is governed by Section 13 
of Article VII, Utah Constitution, regarding claims to 
the Board of Exa1niners. (78 P.2d, p. 521). 
In the Fourth District case the defendant was the 
State Road Coinmission. The ruling of the Fourth Dis~ 
trict case allowing injunetive suit~ against individual 
comtnissioners was dieta.. In the subsequent Hjorth 
case this Court said the dicta of the Fourth District case 
was not the true rule and proceeded to adopt the dissent 
of T\l r. Chief Just ice "\Volfe, in the Fourth District case~ 
,\' ... e can 0111 y conclude, therefore, that the Hj orth case 
overrated the dicta of the Fourth District case4 
In support of this conclusion we quote the concurring 
opinion of Chief Justice Wolfe in the Hj orth case: 
'~I concur. In m~r opinion this case overrules 
State, by State Road Connn. v. District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, 94 LTtah 384, 78 P.2d 
502, at least in it~ spirit and reasoning. '\Thilst 
that case did not jnvolve a prayer for money 
dan1ages for alleged consequential injury but was 
an action to restrain the State Road Commission, 
the ease proceeded on the theory that the R.oad 
Co1nmission eould not be restrained but the cozn-
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missioners persona1ly could be restrained if they 
threatened to da.mage a property owner conse--
quentially and not by a direct taking, unless they 
first paid for the consequential damages which 
they would cause. 
In a long and carefully considered dissent, I 
registered opposition to tlris vj cw b ecanse it was 
my theory that neither the Road Commission nor 
the ind1vidual commissioners could be rest.rained 
fro1n inflicting consequential damages, but only 
from a direct taking without condenmation and 
this on t.he theory that they would tl~e n be tre s-
pa~sing and acting as individuals and "Without 
legislative autho1·ity. In that opinion, the n1atter 
of compenf.;ation by the legislature on approval of 
a claim to the Board of Examiners as substantive 
due process in all its ramifications ~"'as also rl1s-
cns8ed at length. ~ >t: ~~~ (241 P.2d p .. 910). 
On page 28 of appcl1ant's hrief in this tnaiter, the 
plaintiff argues tl1at there 1s no valid distinction betv{een 
an injuT~ctivc su"it and an action for mandamus or decla-
tory relief, and, therefore, since the Fourtl1 Dis t ri et cas P 
authorizes an injunction against .Jndi"\o ... idnal comn'lis-
sio ners, In and an1 ns or der.Iaratory relief should he a vail-
able against jndividual eommissioners. Repeating that in 
our opinion the Hjorth case overruled the Fourth District 
case on this point, "\\'"e no'v adopt the plaintiff's line of 
reasoning and argue that ~inec the individual e..Oul-
missioncrs cannot be enjoin~d from consequential dam-
ages~ the}7 , therefore, cannot be m3Jldarnused or ~ued for 
declaratory relief. 
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In applying the arguments of Justice Wolfe to the 
present situation, we reason as follows: 
(1) The Road Commissioners, if acting within their 
authority are, as agents of the state~ immune from suit 
and cannot be mandamused. 
(2) That there is a fundamental difference between 
a taking and a consequential damage, and that the Con-
stitution guarantees only a substantive right and not a 
procedural remedy as far as a consequential damage 
is concerned. 
(3) That the Board of J:Gxami.ners is an adequate 
remedy and meets the requirements of due process of 
law insofar as the r.laim of plaintiff in the instant situa-
tion. (And we note that b}' ~tatnte appeal can he made 
from an unfavora.ble ruling of the Board of Exatniner8 
to the Legislature. Sec. 63-6-17, lf. C.A. 1953) . 
\\r e cite as an overruling practical consideration the 
prGblem wh·iclt, ]n our opinion, was the primary concern 
of thi~ Court. ·in the Iljorth case; that i~. the 
probletn in granting relief through judicial proceedings 
to all persons \vho might be affected by road improve-
InentR. In arriving at its conclusion in the Hjorth case 
that individual road commissioners need not respond 
personally in consequential damage suitE=~ the Court 
reasoned as follows: 
(1) To hold other-wise, public officials would be 
rearful to act at the risk of finding themselves personally 
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liable for ·.acts in good faith in performance of their 
duties. (241 P.2d pg. 909). 
(2) If all the property to which any consequential 
harmful effects had to be considered and the owners 
joined as condemnees by the Road Commission, it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, for the Cominission to 
know whom they could safely omit from condemnation 
proceedings. The 011ly safe way in which the commis-
sioners could operate would be to join every proparty 
owner abutting on or near the highway projeet in order 
to avoid suits which would result in personal liability 
to them .. The impracticability of imposing such an obliga-
tion upon the public body in the construction and Inain-
tenance of our public highways is obvious. (241 P.2rl 
pg. 909) . 
.A.nd to these arguments may \Ve a.dd that if the 
plaintiff should be suecessful in this utatter, the Road 
Co1nrnissioner.s and the State of Utah would be subject 
to mandamus by every propert~r o'Wller adjoining a 
divided highv{ay in the State of Utah. This could, for 
exarnplc~ IHean suits hy every property owner from 
I~righam City to Springville. 
As a more recent authority for our position in this 
matter, we cite the case of ~-.9tate of "(Jtah ·v.J1'red Tedesco, 
et al., 1955~ 286 P.2d 785, 4 TTtah 2d 31~ In this case 
intervening defendants~ Bird and Evans, Inc. filed a 
claim in a condemnation proceeding against property 
adj oin.ing its property, alleging that its lru1 d would suffer 
if the adjoining land was condemnedL This Court held 
that. loss of an advantageous business relationship be-
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cause of the condemnation of adjoining property would 
not support intervention in a condemnation suit~ and 
that the defense of sovereign immunity was well taken 
to this type of claim for consequential damage. This 
Court then went on to say that: 
''Any clairn defendant ma~y deem it has be~ 
cau~e of damage gro-wing out of the condemnation 
""W' hie.h is not asscrtible becau~e of :.-:;uch sovereign 
immunity rnore properly may be asserted by 
application to tt1e Board of Examiners under the 
provisions of Title 63~6-11 and 63-6-13, T~ .. C.A. 
1953,. for hearing and decision as to the merit of 
the claim.'' ( 286 P .2d pg. 790). 
Applying this ease to the inf.;tant situation it seems clear 
to us that though the plaintiff might present a rJaim 
for consequential damages to the Board of Examiners, 
it cannot sue for eonseqnential damages nor force a 
condemnation suit for the purpose of ascertaining a.nd 
awarding such damages. 
As to Point I, we sub1nit, therefore~ that the indi-
vidual Road Co1nmissioners, when acting within the 
scope of their authority in a skillful and proper manner, 
are irnrnune from suit and c.annot he coercP.d by manda-
mus or other,vi~e into bringing a condemnation suit to 
ascertain consequential dautages. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS F.AJLED TO STATE A CLAIM 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS UPON WH]CH RELIEF CAN BE 
GRANTED. 
We argue first that the District Court did not err 
proced u rail y in granting defend ants' Motion to Dismiss. 
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We rcoognize arid adopt the rule cited by plaintiff in 
his appeal brief to the effect that a cotnplajnt should 
not be dismissed for insuf ficienc~y· unless it appears for 
a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under 
any state of facts which can be proved in support Gf the 
elaim. (Brief of ... ~ppellant, p. 9; Blackham v~ Snelgrove, 
1955, 3 1 ~ .2d 15 7, 280 P. 2d 453). In ascertaining with 
"certa.intyH that plaintiff's cotnplrunt has no meritt the 
Court n1a~y consider the absence of law as well as facts 
to substantiate the claim. (2 lioores Fed Prac. 2nd Ed .. 
2244). The motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) per-
fornts substantially the same function as the o 1 d connn on 
1 a \\o~ general d e1n urre r. rr hough the well p1 eaded material 
allegations of plaintiffts complaint are admitted by 
defendants~ )fotion to Dismiss, conclusions of law or 
unwarranted deductions of facts are not admitted. (2 
I\{oores f.,ed. ·Prac., supra). rPherefore~ if as a matter of 
la\v the District Court felt that plaintiff had no cause 
of action, no matter what the plaintiff might later prove 
in support of the factual allegations of hi8 complajnt, 
then the District Court "\Vas justified in dismissing the 
complaint on defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure 
to state a cia int. The reoo rd doe~ not disclose the basis 
upon ,vhich the Trial Court did disrniss plaintiff's eom-
pJaint. J lo\vever:t on the haRi~ of defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss (See R~ 4) we rna y assmne the eo1nplai n t was dis-
Ini~~ed either on the general ground of lack of jurisdiction 
or the general ground of failure to state a claim, or on 
both. If dismissed for failure to state a claim this could 
have been J=.ecause the facts alleged were without merit or 
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because as a matter of law the plaintiff was entitled to 
no relief; and in deciding as a matter of la'v that plaintiff 
had failed to state a clai.In, tlte District Court could 
have based tllis decision on a preliminary decision of lack 
of jurisdictionr (i1/iles v. Armstrong, C.A. 7th, 1953, 207 
F .. 2d 284, as abstracted at 2 Jtfoores 1~~ed. Prac., ~nd 
I~~d. 1 1958 Supp., P~ 200)4 
\V e subrnit that even admitting the well pleaded 
material allegations of plaintiff's complaint, ( 1) plain tiff 
ha~ failed to state a claim by rea..~on of the Court's lack 
of juri~diction over the defendani.s1 (2) plaintiff has 
failed to state a claim by reason that the datnage claimed 
is not eornpent:;able in a court of law. It: is a ''certaint).,., 
that plaintiff is entitled to no judicial re 1 ief no matter 
what state of facts he might be able to prove in support 
of hi:-) -claim. 
Having treated the jurisdiction proble1u lUlder 
Point I above, we novl argue that the damage claimed 
by plaintiff is not compensable in a court of la\v and that 
for this reason th~ plaintiff has failed to state a claim 
upon 'vhich relief can be granted. 
It is the position of defendants that by nature of 
the police po1vers of the R·oad Commission as exercised 
by the individual members thereof, it ma~r construct 
the strips or islands of 'vhich plaintiff complains without 
compensation for any re~ultnnt inconvenience or damage 
to adjacent propert~~r o\vners .. By Section 27-2-7, U.C.A. 
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1953, the Road Commission is granted the follo-wing 
powers: 
,,,., :1 .. 
(2) To formulate and adopt rules and regu-
lations for the expenditure of public funds for 
th.e construction, improvement and maintenance 
of state highways, and other purposes authorized 
by la~r, and for letting contracts for any work 
which the commission is authorized by law to do. 
• • • 
(6) To make such rnles and regulations gov-
erning the use by the public of state roads as may 
be necessary to provide for public safety and 
against undue use of the state roads. 
:1= • * 
(10) To adopt regulations in regard to 
traffic on state roads, not in conflict "With law, and 
to close state roads under constroetion. • • • 
Further authority is granted. as follows: 
The high,vay authorities of the state~ counties,. 
cities and towns are authorizeo to so design any 
limited-access facility and to so regulate, restrict, 
or prohibit access as to best serve the traffic for 
which such facility is intended; ~ • • In tl1is c.on-
nection such hlghway authorities are authorized 
to divide and separate any limited-access facility 
into separate roadways by the construction of 
raised curbingst central dividing sections~ or other 
physical separations~ or by designating such 
separate roadways by signs, markers, stripes, and 
the proper lane for su~_h traffjc by appropriate 
signs,. markers, stripes, and other devices .. • • • 
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In the case of Zions Railroad and Light Corporation v .. 
Liftdsey, 211. Iowa 544, 231 N.W~ 461, it was held: 
·~Primarily the right to establish, regulate and 
control highways rests in the state and it Inay 
delegate such powers to board~, eommissions~ pub-
lic or municipal corporations/' 
We arc dealing here with the general problem of the 
right of adjoining property owners to ar_.eess to public 
highways. (See general digeu8sion 25 Am. Jur.~ Highways, 
Sec. 154). We agree with plaintiff that. this ~'right of 
access'' has been recognized in l~t.ah and would stipulate 
that the Utah cases cited by plaintiff in his appeal brief 
under Point II are authority for this position~ However, 
with the modern advent of the "'limited access'" highway,. 
it is necessary that 've carefully scrutinize the correct 
proportions of this right. It has been ~tated: 
'"The Hmited access highway has provided 
one of the most effectivP. and popular means of at 
least alleviating traffic problems. However, the 
general recognition of the right of abutting prop-
erty owners to an easement of ingress or egress 
in high,vays bounding their property, com1nonly 
called a J:rig ht of ar_cess, ' has placed severe ob-
stacles ln the way of the gro·wth. of sur.h highway 
~ysterns, sinee the existence of such~ right gives 
a high commercial value to property adjoining 
heavily travelled roadways, and the expense of 
condP-..mning suc-h rights greatly increases the al-
ready high cost of roadbuilding." (Annotation, 
''Abutting Ovmers Right To Damages or their 
Relief for Loss of Access Because of Lirnited 
Access Highway or Street,'J 43 .ALR 2d. 1072). 
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This right of aecc ~s it5 o bvicusly not nnlimit ed. It 
n1us t be reeonciled \Vi th the police po1vers of the state 
to regulate and control public highways for the general 
peace, safety and \Vel fare. A.nd it lli subordinate to th-e 
public convenience, of \vhich tlle pub]ic authorities having 
control of the streets are the j ndges, and is suhj ect to 
such reasonable use of the street, not inconsistent with 
it~ ntain ten a nee n;s a public high 1vay, as ma~y be neces saiJ,. 
for the public good and convenience and does not serious-
l_y rJnpair it (24 A n1+ J ur., Pub. Higllw·ays, supra). 
l.t is obvious that the courts ate at \\ .. ide d-jvergence 
as to \vhen and to \vhat extent eompensation should he 
made for interference with this right of access. (See. 
Annot.ation 43 ALR .2d, supra, and cases supplernental 
thereto a11d note discu8sion, i'J ust Coinpensat1on," H'enry 
~1. Kaltenbaeh, a-402, pg·. 34). rpo bring all interference 
no n1atter of 'vhat shade or degree, v.ithin the orbit of 
condcinnation and compensation, \vould create the im-
possible liability feared by this Court as expressed in 
I-Ijorth r_ase. (IIjorth v. \Vhittenburg, supr~) On the 
other hand, as long as the courts continue to recognize 
the right of access as a valuable property right, com-
pensation ''lithin proper lin1i.tt5 and in the proper aetion 
or proceeding must be made4 ~A..s long a:s the law in this 
matter remains unsettled, each case whether viev~:ed by 
the Court in a proper proceeding or by the Board of 
~'JxaTniners in a proper proceeding, must be considered 
separately. 
Ho1vever, it is our opinion that this ·Court has estab-
lished a rule and test that must guide us in tlte inRtant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
situation. In the case of Robinett -u. Price (1929), 74 
l -tah 512, 280 P ac~ 736 1 the fact situation was alntost 
identical to tlte fact ~ituatjon in our present ease~ The 
plaintiff o"'~ed a piece of propert}·' on the south\\~est 
corner of the intersection of lOth Street and an unnarned 
high"\\,.a}r in PriPe. Utah. Becau~e of certain rail,vay tracks 
ru u n i ng bet "veen the h igh\\.-a)· and ~VI ai n Street heyond 
( ,vhi~h tracks as to inteTI\~renec eorrespond ex..aeti.J• with 
the eUlJerett~ strips cornplaincd of in the instant ta~e) 
Tenth Street "\vas closed as an acee8s street to ~iain 8t .. 
(This in effect is 1vhat has happened to 7th South Street 
in our instant case; ire., by nature of the concrete islands 
it is no longer possible to gain access to lf. Sr HighVt'ay 89-
91 from 7th So4 Rt.). Tenth Street running south from tl1e 
high "Tay along the east line of plaintiff's property was 
not closed or discontinued. (7th South Street running 
east from :Main Street along the south line of plaintiff~s 
property in the instant case has not been clo~ed or dis~ 
continued).. The high ~Tay on "',.hi ch plain tiff'~ property 
abutted on the south \Vas not closed or dit5continued .. 
(Main Street on which plaintiff~~ property abutts to the 
east is not closed or discontinued in the instant case -
although traffic has been rerouted in one direction 
thereon).. The highway on 1\'hieh plaintiff's property 
abutted to the south afforded him ready ingress or 
egress to and from the north boundary of l1is property .. 
(~{a in Street on which plain tiff'~ property abut t.s to the 
east affords plaintiff in the instant case ready ingress 
or egress to and from Main Street, so long as travelling 
in a northward direction)+ The Court stated that what~ 
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on tite evidence, was claimed by plaintiff wa.s not that 
ingress or egress to his property "\vas cut off by closing 
Tenth Street, but that he was tllereby deprived of the 
direct route whlch he theretofore had and enjoyed in 
travelling from his property to the principal or main 
portion of the city, v.'hich depreciated the value of his 
property and greatly decreased the rental value of his 
building rnaintained thereon. (280 P. pg 737). (What, by 
the · cornp 1 a in t, plaintiff in. the instant ease cla.:i m s is not 
that ingress or egress to his property has been cut off 
by the concrete strips but that no'v though travel north~ 
ward from his _property has been unchanged; travel 
south,vard rnust take a some-\vhat more circ.ui tous route,. 
and ilirect access from Main Street to l~- S. Highway 
89~91, 30 feet away,. bas been irnpeded). 
In the Robinett case the eourt held that where 
closing and discontinuance of a portion of the street 
did not interfere 'vith property o\vner;..:; J means of egress 
and ingress, but nlerel y d epr1ved h iln of direct route to 
the main busine~s portion of the r~.It.y, depreciating prop-
e~ty va]ue:.-:; BJid rendering rental more difficult, the 
property owner had not sustained such a special loss 
en titling hi rn to cornpensatio n. 
The 1-tob"inett case suggest"s two tests: (1) the party 
aggrieved must suffer some injury special in kind or 
degree from the rest of the public, 1nore than mere 
depreciation or loss of rental value~ ( 2) Egress or ingress 
rnust be prevented or materially affected .. (280 P. pg .. 
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737) t The inconvenience and resultant loss of rental value 
in the instant ease meets neither of these tests .. 
In support of defendants' position on this Point 
and consistent with the tests of the Robinett case (supra), 
we cite the follo-wing authority. 
First, we refer the Court to certain related a11:d 
general rules: 
Highways officials are not personally liable for acts 
done honestly in the exercise of the discretion which the 
law gives them in constructing or maintaining a highway, 
although their acts result in a trespass or damage to 
an abutting property owner. (90 ALR 1482). In the 
absence of fraud it js generally heJd that citizens or 
taxpayers 'vho fail to show any such injury to them not 
sustained by the general public, are not entitled to 
complain of the rerouting or change of route or change 
or removal of directional signs. (97 ALR 192) .. Traffic 
regulations which interfere with or restrict access to 
and from abutting property are valid if they are reason-
able and necessary for public convenience. (100 ALR 491) 
It generally has been held that a property owner has no 
right to compensation for diversion of traffic by the 
relocation or rerouting of highways. (118 A LR 921)~ 
Since there are innumerable cases in this general 
area, \Ve cite hereafter only more recent authority .. 
In the ease of Jluse v. J1ississippi ~9tate Highu,ay 
Canunis.~ion 1 103 S. 2d 852, it was held that a highv,~ay 
cormnission has the right to construct 1nedian Rtrip~ in 
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four l~e high,vay 1vithout the payment of.compensation 
to an abutting o\vner for damages resulting therefrom 
c Vt!n t houglt eons tructi on re~ tri cts c. on den 1 n c e' t:J right of 
access to east or north-bound traffic lanes * s *.. rJ~he 
O"'\ovner's inconvenience is one sha.red by general public as 
incident to the proper exercise of police power~ 
(Note that the Constitution of the State of 1t:Iississippi 
provides that private property shall not be taken or 
danwgetl for publie use unless due comp~nsation is first. 
rnade.) 
In the case of (].araz:ella v. State, 269 \"\rise. 608a, 71 
1\. \V'~ 2d 276, it \Vas held tl1at 'vhere an existing high,vay 
is converted into a limited access highway but abutting 
lando,vner'~ acccs~ to ordinary highvlay is merely made 
rnorc circuitous, there is no taking of pre-existing ease-
lnent of access and no compensation will be paid under 
eminent domain. 
In the cat:le of Sntick t\ (}rnnn~:on1J.~eaJt-h, 1954, l(y~ 268 
S .. V\T~2d 4~4~ jt \vas 1teld that 'vhere a side Rtreet upon 
·which plaintiff's property fronted \Vas closed at one end 
hy the construction of a througl1,vay, thus creating a. 
cul-de-sac ~ituation., there \~·a~ no l'ig.ht of cornpensation. 
In the case of ThonuJ..b' and JJ7 uruer Tn.r... t'~ Ci!ty of 
1\-; eu~ Oorlea·n ... -.·, J 956, J ~a~, 89 S~2d 885~ aeccss to plai nti rf 's 
property \'-Tl~ ·impaired hy the rJosing of one street and 
the Jo'" ... ering of the grade of another street. It 1\ ... as held 
that plaintiff v,cas not entitled to compensation since 
traffic eould still reach the plaintiff~~ property h y a 
n1ore circuitous route~ and that this ineonveniene.e 'vas 
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suffered by the public in general. (Louisiana, incidentally, 
is both "a taking and damage state.n) 
In the case of UJ/n,q ley Shopping 0 e-nter v. State 
Roads C o·m missivn) 193 7, 1:[d4 131 A. 2d 690~ a hi gh,vay 
was reconstructed making it a divided four lane du.al 
~lif!;hw·ay. A n1eilian strip divided north-bound and south-
bound lanes of traffic so that left turnR eould not be 
rnade directly into plaintiff~s property and opposite 
shopping c.enterft l\fotorists would have to turn at a 
traffic 1ight or take a more circuitous route to reach 
the shopping eenters. Property owners sued to enjoin 
the State Road Commission frorn installing the rncdian 
strip, maintaining that it amounted to a substantial 
denial oi their rights of ingress and egress and a taking 
of property without compensation. rrhe court found that 
there was no such denial of aerRss as to conRtitute a 
taking. It felt that the facts alleged made the case more 
nearly akin to a diversion of traffie than to a blocking 
of access to the high"\vay, and since the state could, if 
it desired, divert traffic entirely a"\vay from the ~hopping 
centers without being liable in damages, it eould e~~rtainly 
and in the inte re~t of safety, interpose a11 ob~ta(·lc 
making aceess le~6 ea::;:v. but 'vhieh '~·ould not aetually 
destroy the arec~~~, and like~Nise not lH~ 1 iahlc for da.ntagre~. 
In the case of Rtnnelli ·u .. City of l:vTPn~ Orleuns~ J 957~ 
La. 9G S .. 2d 572~ a railroad overpass \\"as eonstrueted to 
the east of plain tiff's p ropert}'" -v.,•hie,h con1pletely b l oeked 
hiH acce8s to an .adjoining street. In order to rea.eh l5aid 
street he had to travel an extra 3000 feet. The Sup-reme 
Court approved the action of the Trial Court in refusing 
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to allow an)"" damages ~,hatsoever, and stated that it 
had repeatedly held that under the police power a city 
rna y divert traffic without subjecting itself to liability, 
and that any damages suffered were general rather than 
special. 
In the case of Oklahoma Turnp;ke Authority v. 
Chandler, 1957, Okla. 316 P.2d 828, it 'vas held that as 
a general prOJ)Osition a property owner may reeover 
com pensatj on for losR of access only if he can sho"lh~ that 
the closing of the road has especially damaged him as 
distinguished from general damages to the con1munity~ 
The darnages Inust be different in kind, not merely in 
degree. 1"he lando,vner must suffer more than mere 
inconvenience. ( Oklaho1na, incidentally, is both ~~a taking 
and damage state~' ') 
In the case of State IJ.igkway Department v~ Strick~ 
land, 1958, Ga. 102 S.E42d 3, Strickland and others sought 
an injunction against the State Highway Depart1nent 
to restrain it from the constructing a curb 16 feet from 
their property and 22 feet from the center of lf. S. 
Highway 3414 Strickland operated a wholesale 1neat 
packing plant on hjs tract 'vhich abutted the highway, 
and for many years large trucks had been in the hab1t 
of backing up to a loading and unloading platform 
connected 'vith this plant. The proposed curbing made 
this operation irnpossible although there were two 30 
foot driveways whirll Strickland could use after the 
curbing ,,,.as in~talled. The Suprente Court held that the 
installation 'vas a proper traffic control device and did 
not involve an appropriation of any of the property or 
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a trespaf.;~ thereon. In the course of its holding, it said 
that abutting property owners are not entitled as against 
the public to access to their ]and at all points in the 
boundary between it. and the highway 80 long as they 
are still afforded a convenient acces.s to their property. 
ln the case of City ServiJce Oil ()ompany v~ City of 
N eu} Y ark, 1958, }; . Y ~ 154 N ~E.2d 814, C~ i ty Service Oil 
Co1npany sought injunctive relief and damages because 
of the establjshinent of bus stops on a corner where one 
of its gasoline stations v.ras located. TheN e"\\~ York Court 
or Appeals ruled that the eompany~s claim that the right 
of .ingress and egress is a paramount property right 
was erroneous~ It said that on the contrary, it is the right 
of t.he public to the use or the streets~ which is absolutr. 
and paran1ount. It affirmed the action of the ·Trial Court 
in denying the claim, stating that a mun1eipa11ty may 
regulate and conrtol trafric, and unless such regulation 
is arbi trar_y· and ca pri ciou s,. it \\.111 not be res trained 
although the abutting ov?ners may be inconvenienced by 
such regulation. 
To dis tingni sh the cases cited b~y plain tiff 1,ve first 
point out that the defendant in the case of Duuly .Block 
et al D. k9alt L-ake Rapid Transit Company (.li.ppellant's 
brief, pg. 9) ease was a private corporation and not the 
State of Utah, its agents, or an agency thereof~ The 
interesting thing about the Dooly caset however, which 
apparently plain tiff failed to note:- is that although the 
~-ourt recognized the right of access, light and air. it holds 
that a znunicipal corporation when empowered by t.he 
l Jeg islature, may devote a reasonable portion of a f.; tree t 
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to the use of a street railv.ray 1\rithout compensation to 
abutting O\vnerR ; only \Vh en the entire width of the street, 
or at least ~o mueh as to render ordinar~y traffic "impossi-
blet js devoted to railroad purpo~es is the interference 
unla,vful. The conrt indicated that another railroad track 
along 2nd So. St., in addition to track.s already in placet 
\VDuld be unneeessaryr This case stands for nothing more 
titan that \vhen interference 1\--i.tlt egre~8 or ingress i8 un-
n eeessa ry ~ and total or matcri al, s ueh ir1.te rference .i ~ un-
la\ovful.. rrhe eourt also ~tated, 1nc.idental1y, thai an abut-
ting o'vnPr may 1nake any and all proper use of the street~ 
sub jer.t to proper and reasona. ble municipal control and 
police regulation:5. It is also interesting to note the foJlo\v-
iiig language of the court: 
"' 1it 1ft!; "(;,): rphe right of lllllil iei palitiPs to grant 
franchisPs to private corporations for the con-
struction and operation of street railways, when 
einpo\ver·ed by the legislature so to do, is not now, 
it seems, an open question, although streets were 
originally not designed for that purpose, but \vere 
rnostly eonfin.cd to the right of public travel in 
the ordinary· mode~. Enlightened public policy, 
advanced civilization~ and a desire to subserve 
publjc intere8t, have induced courts to become 
more lax in the enforcf'..mPnt of strict technical 
rules and principles in this regard, and it appears 
no\v to be o,vell settled by judicial authority that 
a reasonable portion of a street may be devoted 
for the purposes of a street railway, and that 
such is a proper use of the t:1treet/' (33 P .. pg. 232) 
It would seetn that enJightened public policy, advanced 
civilization and a desire to subserve pub lie interest 
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should no\v recognize the rea son able and skillfu] use o.f 
divided high\vays. 
The case of Morris v. Oregon Sho-rt LineR .. Company 
(Appellanf~ brief, p._ 10) also ma~y· be diBtinguiRhed by 
the nature of the partiP.s involved. rt should also he noted 
that the "I\·1 orris case \\··as COln•nellCed ¥rh.en th-e defendant 
cotnmenced construction of tvfo additional tracks in front 
of the plaintiff's property. The court stated: 
''No dan1ages are c]ain~ed b.\~ reHHon ot the 
laying and the operation of trains over the first 
two tracks. ~ ... either is there any ciaitn tnade that 
the appellant did not have the legal right to lay 
said tracks~ or to operate its trains over them in 
the street afore~aid/' (102 P., p .. G30) .. 
The evidence \vas that the additional tracks "\Vonld greatly 
impede egress and ingress. (T,vo~ three or more dividing 
strips rnight be illlreason able and greatly irnpede plain-
tiff's ingress or egresR. The concrete strips as presently 
existing 1vould appear only a reasonable exercise of the 
pol iee power of the stat e.) The court 1rvas also careful to 
stipulate that an o'vner of property, \Vhich abutt~ on a 
public street, ltacl such a property right that he rnay 
recover from interference with sueh tight., only in a 
prope.,. action~ 
Without going into detail we note that in the eru;e of 
State by State Ro:ad Commissi·an v. Ro.::-:elle, et ·ux~, (Ap-
pellant ~s brief, p .. 11) the Court talks about unreasonably 
cutting off access.. No unreasonable cutting off i~ alleged 
by plaintiff in the present case. 
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In the case of Boskovich 1: .. M~dvale C~ty CorporatWtt, 
(Appellant's brief, p. 11) the court it self distinguished 
said case from tlte Robinett case (supra) on the grounds 
that the Boskovich ease involves a duly platted subdi-
vision containing streets and alleysr This eireumstance, 
of course7 suggests new and different legal concepts and 
makes the case, we believe, inapplicable to the present 
situation. 
After distinguishing the 1Jtah eases cited by plain-
tiff and under the test of the Rrobinett case as supported 
by the other authorities cited ahove 7 we submit that the 
insta.n t situation is not one of either a taking or an inter-
ferenee sufficient to warrant cornpensati.on. The plaintiff 
I 
has suffered no injury special in kind or degree from 
the rest of the public more than mere depreciation or 
loss of rental valuer and fron1 tlle facts as alleged, egress 
or ingress has not been prevented or materially affected. 
The instant situation falls simply withln the reasonable, 
ski IIi ul and competent exercise of t 11 e police power of 
the state in regulating highvray~ and the traffic thereon 
for the public welfare. 
A t5 to tl1e propriety of the use of mandamus in this 
type of si tua ti on,. ";-c are satisfied to repeat plaintiff's 
argument that there i8 no valid di~tinction between au 
injunctive suit, as brought in the 'fl~ourth District case, 
and an action for mandamus or declaratory relief. This 
being true, it. follo'\vs that if an injunction will not lie, 
:then 1nandamns \vi1l not lie. Ho\vever, 've further argue 
that there are three manrlatory elements of a mandamus 
action: (1) a clear, unquestionable right to mandan1us in 
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the parties seeking same; (2) a clear legal duty to act 
on the part of the party to whom the writ is directed; 
(3) absence of any other remedy at law. (See 55 C.t'J.S., 
Mandamus, Sec. 51). None of these elements are met 
in the instant situation. In connection wi.th (3) it has 
been held that 'vhere an administrative remedy is avail-
able, it must be exhausted before mandanius \vill lie4 
(Reardon v. Daly City, 1945 Cal.,. 163 P. 2d 462) .. 
In the case of Ho ftm-am.. v. Lewis~ Judge, 31 TJtah 
1791 87 P. 167, 170, 1906, this Court stated: 
''But even in the case of mandate the legal 
right to require the person or court to proceed, 
and the legal duty to do so must be free from 
doubt ; otherwise even this remedy must be de-
nied/'" (87 P.,. p .. 170). 
In the case of Board of Educafi'(Jn of Ogden v. An-
derson, 93 T~tah 522, 74 P. 2d 681, 1937, this Court held 
that: 
"Wltere the writ [of mandamus] is sought to 
coin pel action on the part of the cou1t [ o-ffi eer or 
tribunal] the legal right to t.he partieular action 
which is sought to be compelled by the writ must be 
clear and the legal duty to do the act or thing 
demanded~ 4 • must be equally clea1·4'' (74 P. 2d, 
p. 683). 
In general~ as to mandamus,. it has been stated~ 
'' A·1 andamus is a remedy at law employed to 
compel the performance, when refused, of a min-
isterial duty, this being its chief use..'' 
(34 Am .. Jur .. , Mandamus, Sec.. 4, and cases cited)4 
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~ Rer ltedy i~ in person run to enforce the obliga-
tion of th.c individual to "\vhom addressed ~ it does 
not reach the office nor can it be directed to the 
office.'' 
( 3 4 A r n ~ J'J u r., lvl an dam us, Sec. 7, and cases (~ i ted)~ 
'"'llhe immunity of a state prevents nlandamus 
against a public officer_, board or comm.1sf.;ion 
where it is in .reality a proceeding against the sov-
ereign .. '' 
(34 Am~ ~Jur .. , hfandronus~ Sec.123, and cases cited). 
An instructive diseu~sion of v,7 hen and when not an 
action against a public otficial is a Ruit against the state 
is had in Pen-noye1~ L~r L~i cC onnattghy, 140 lT .S. 1, ll S. Ct 
699, 35 L. Eel 363.. It is there said: 
~"The fin:;t el~s i~ \\'l1cre the su1t is brought 
against tltc officers of the state, as representing 
the state's action and liability, tltus ntaking it~ 
thou g 11 not a party to the reeo rd, the real party, 
against \Vhich the judgment "Will so operate as 
to compel it to specifically perforrn its eontraets.'' 
In our opinion tl1c legal right of tl1e plaintiff to 
compel a condemnation suit i::::. not clear and unquestion-
able, nor is there any clear legal duty under the facts 
as alleged on the part of the Road Commissioners to 
eoinn1enee a eoru.lt~nn~aiion suit. \V·e find nothlng in our 
En1incnt Dorna.in statute Cl,itle 78~ Chapter 3±~ TTJJ.A. 
1953) that clearly eornpels a condemnation suit for con-
sequential damage. Nothing in the mandatoijT cotnplaint 
form s ecrns to eonternplate such a situation. (Sec~ 78-34-6, 
r_;+c.A. 1953).. In faet~ as argued above, no such duty 
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does exist in the case of a consequential damage resulting 
from legitimate use of the police power in regulating and 
maintaining public. h.lghv,~ay~. 'Phat the defendant ha~ 
an adequatl~ reinedy through the Board of Exanriner8 
has been eon·vincingly argued by Chief ,Justice ·\v· olfe~ 
and seemEi=t to be the rule of the Iljorth case, not\Vith-
standing plain tiff~ s argument to the eon trary. .And it is 
obvious that a n1andan1ns act. ion agai uHt the individual 
Road Commissioners for the purpo~c of eo•npcHi.ng a 
condernnat.ion suit is j u reall ty a proeeedir1g- aga1n~t. the 
+ 
sovere1gn~ 
~,or these reasonH it seen•~ to u~ that Inandarnu~ •s 
not a prO}.lCr p-r·oceeding. 
"\Y-e repeat that ~A7e do not kno'v on 'vhat grounds tl1e 
District ·Court disrnissed plaintiff's complaint. By virtue 
of the ground8 for dismi~salset out in defendant~~ rnotion 
to dis-rniss~ \YC (Jan as~urne the rornplaint "'~as dislnisscd 
fol' either laek of ,juri Hdietion or for i"ai]ure 1 u state a 
clain1. A.ssurning tlLe Di ~triet Court. dcei sion \\'HS based 
on ei t.h er ~round, '~le rec l p la Inti ff'~ argo. rn en ts r-cgard.!Ilg 
manrlanl LIS and deelarat.or.v judgn1ent. are prPnlature, nn-
necessar_y· and iinntatcrial to a ruling on this appeaL But 
in anfnver to pla1nt1:ftjs argument regarding d~(:larat.ory 
judgments, \\·e rc·fer the (~onrt. t.o Sr~~~ ion 7S-;~a-ti~ i_~ .C.2\... 
1953~ , .. ·hieh provides as !\lllO\v~: 
HThe court rnav refuse to render or enter a 
.... 
declaratory judgrnent or decree 'vhere such judg-
ment or uccrec, -If rende-red or entered, 1vouid not 
te rrninate the uncertainty or con trove rs y giving 
ri~e to the proceeding.~' 
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Even assu~ting the District Court decided as prayed 
-f o r by plain tiff that the ·impeding of egress and ingress 
1~ a.'. q.am~ge: to )\thich plaintiff is constitutionally entitled 
t_o comp~nsation, and that defendants have a duty to ini-
tiate eminent domain proceedings for that purpose, 'vonld 
suclt a finding terminate the uncertainty or controversy 
giving rise to the proceeding1 \Vhat about the problem of 
juri sdi ct ion over the individual commissioners I Even as-
suming the conclusion of law argued by plai;ntiff, has 
plaintiff stated a claim in his complaint four-square mth~ 
in such conclusion? 
Certainly~ '\Ve feel that the District Court could have felt, 
with strong reason, that a declaratory statement regard-
ing· egre:.-::.s and ingress would not terminate the ''uneer~ 
tainty or eontroversy giving rise to the proceedlng.n It 
was well "Withln the discretion of the Court to refll8e a 
declaratory· judginent. 
CONCijUSION 
Bither on thP. ground of lack of jurisdiction over 
the person or on the gro~nd of failure to state a claim 
upon 'vhicl1 relief can be granted it was proper for the 
District Court to di sntiss plaintiff's com plaint. 
As to lack of jurisdiction, defendants submit ~ 
. . 
1. By v~rtu~ of the pri1ne authority of the Fourth 
District case . .the District Court has no jurisdiction over 
the defendants collectively as members of the State Road 
Commission. 
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2. By virtue of the dissenting opinion of Chief Jns-
tice Wolfe in the Fourth District case as adopted by this 
Court in the subsequent Hjorth case~ and other authority,. 
the District Court has no jurisdiction over the defendants 
as inilividual commissioners. 
As to the plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be grante~ defendants submit: 
1.. The District Court did not err in· dismissing the 
complaint for as a matter of law the plaintiff failed to 
state a claim regardless of what facts plaintiff might 
prove in support of hls claim. 
2. The erection of rnedian strips on a public high-
way in a skillful and reasonab1e manner for the regula-
tion of traffic and to provide for public safety is a legi-
timate exercise of the police power of the state. 
3. Plaintiff has alleged no injury special in kind or 
degree fron1 the rest of the public, nor that egress or 
ingress has been prevented or materially affected .. 
We also submit that neither mandamus nor declara-
tory judgment are proper remedies in this case1 though, 
in our opinion, a decision as to these matters is unneces-
sary to a. ruling on this appeal. 
We finish by asking: if the commissioners ''condemn~" 
( 
the plaintiff's right of access, a consequential damage is 
found and an award made, how many others having an 
alleged right of access should be joined in eminent domain 
proceedings t In the words of this Court in the Hjortb 
case: 
''We hold that where consequential injury to 
property arises out of the faithful and honest per-
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forma.nee of duties imposed by law upon members 
of the Ro~ Conunission, $llch officials are not 
required to respond personally. The argument of 
plaintiffs' . eo.unsel against the injustice to his 
clients of sovereign i1nmunity is eloquent and 
persuasive. The remedy is not to be found in 
imposing an unreasonable ~nd arbitrary burden 
upon these public officials. Thls phase of our law 
is well established and of long standing. If it is 
to be changed, that must come through the sov-
ereign power of this cormnon ·vlealth, the people, 
speaking through the legislature." 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDG~~ 
Attorney General 
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  






-- . .--·- .... .- .. ----------~· 
~~-------~ . ·--··- -·· .... ~ ~-----.......-____.~ 





··---·· ... - .. --·-·-·· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  









































































Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
